

MAT 1700

LÖSNINGSFÖRSLAG

SEMINAR # 6

Merk: Oppgavene 3 og 4 dekker
pensem gjennomgått i forelesning

Solutionsmanual Oppgavesett # 6

(Friday, Feb 22, 2008)

Oppgave 1 $U(w) = \ln(w)$

$$E(w) = .20(30) + .80(5) = \underline{10}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U[E(w)] &= \text{utility from the actuarial value} = \ln(10) \\ &= U[10] = \ln(10) = \underline{2.30} \end{aligned}$$

(b) $E[U(w)] = .20U(30) + .80U(5)$
 $= .20(3.40) + .80(1.61) = \underline{1.97}$

(c) Sikkerhetsekvivalent (SE) beløp

Verdien av spilletts aktuariske (forentnings-) beløp justert for usikkerhet. Med risk-aversion, er derfor SE-beløp $< E(w) = \text{aktuarisk beløp}$.


Alltså: Det usikre beløpet, $E(w) = 10$, har
SE-verdi = 7.17. Det er maks. beløpet vi er villig til å betale for å delta i dette spillet med forentet beløp = 10.

$$\text{"Risk-premie"} = E(w) - \text{SE-beløp} = \underline{2.83}$$

Obs. nyttefunksjonen reflekterer (indirekte) aktørens holdning til risiko, og pris (her: 2.83) på risiko!

Oppgave 1Seminar #6

$$U(\omega) = \ln(\omega)$$



Sikkerhetsekvivalent (\leq)-belopp = 7,17

(Risikopremien \equiv $E(\omega) - \text{Sikkerhetsekvivalent belopp} = 100 - 7,17 = \underline{2,83}$)

$$E[U(\omega)] = p_L U(\omega_L) + p_H U(\omega_H) = .20(30) + .80(5) = 1,97$$

↓

$$\omega = e^{\frac{E[U(\omega)]}{1,97}} = e^{\frac{1,97}{1,97}} = \underline{7,17}$$

$U[E(\omega)] > E[U(\omega)] \Rightarrow \text{risk-aversion!}$

$$2,30 > 1,97$$

Oppgave 2

$$U(w) = w^2$$

(a) $E(w) = .50(50) + .50(150) = 100$

$$U[E(w)] = U(100) = 100^2 = \underline{10,000}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E[U(w)] &= .50U(50) + .50U(150) \\ &= .50(50^2) + .50(150^2) = 1250 + 11250 \\ &= \underline{12500} \end{aligned}$$

Ja; fordi forventet mytte (12500 utils) er større enn mytten av spilletts forventnings(aktuasjons) verdi.

$$\begin{aligned} U[E(w)] &< E[U(w)] \\ 10,000 &< 12500 \end{aligned}$$

(b) $E[U(w)] = 12500; w = (12500)^{\frac{1}{2}} = \underline{111,8}$


er maksimal betakningswillighet for denne aktoren

(c) Risikopremien = -11,80

$$= E(w) - Sikkerhetsekvivalent belopp = SE-belopp$$

$$= 100 - \lceil E[U(w)] \rceil = 100 - \lceil 12500 \rceil$$

$$= 100 - 111,80 = \underline{-11,80}$$

Oppgave 2Risk-seekerSeminar #6

Oppgave 3

$$E(r_p) = \omega_1 E(r_1) + (1-\omega_1) E(r_2)$$

$$\sigma_p^2 = \omega_1^2 \sigma_1^2 + (1-\omega_1)^2 \sigma_2^2 + 2\omega_1(1-\omega_1) \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$= \omega_1^2 \sigma_1^2 + (1-\omega_1)^2 \sigma_2^2 + 2\omega_1 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2) - 2\omega_1^2 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_p^2}{\partial \omega_1} = 2\omega_1 \sigma_1^2 + 2(1-\omega_1) \sigma_2^2 (-1) + 2 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2) - 4\omega_1 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$2\omega_1 \sigma_1^2 + 2\omega_1 \sigma_2^2 - 4\omega_1 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2) = 2\sigma_2^2 - 2 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$\Rightarrow \omega_1 (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 - 2 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)) = \sigma_2^2 - \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$\omega_1^* = \frac{\sigma_2^2 - \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 - 2 \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2)} ; \quad \text{Kov}(r_1, r_2) = p_{12} \sigma_1 \sigma_2$$

$$\omega_2^* = (1 - \omega_1^*)$$

Imsett at $\text{Kov}(r_1, r_2) = p_{12} \sigma_1 \sigma_2$; $[-1.00 \leq p_{ij} \leq +1.00]$

$$\omega_1^* = \frac{\sigma_2^2 - p_{12} \sigma_1 \sigma_2}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 - 2 p_{12} \sigma_1 \sigma_2}$$

$$\underline{p = -1}: \quad \omega_1^* = \frac{\sigma_2^2 + \sigma_1 \sigma_2}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 + 2 \sigma_1 \sigma_2} = \frac{\sigma_2 (\sigma_2 + \sigma_1)}{(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)}$$

perfekt, negativ
Korr. Koeff

$$= \frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2}$$

Oppgave 3, con't

$\rho = \underline{+1}$:
perfekt, positiv
korr-koeff.

$$\omega_1^* = \frac{\sigma_2^2 - \sigma_1 \sigma_2}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 - 2\sigma_1 \sigma_2} = \frac{\sigma_2 (\sigma_2 - \sigma_1)}{(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)(\sigma_1 - \sigma_2)}$$

Oppgave 4 likevektet portefolje med N aksjer

$$(a) \text{ Variansledd} = \underline{200} = N$$

$$\text{Kovar-ledd} = N^2 - N = N(N-1) = 200(199) \\ = \underline{39.800} !$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(r_p) &= \frac{1}{N} \sum \frac{\sigma_i^2}{N} + \left(N - \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{\sum \sum \text{Cov}(r_i, r_j)}{N(N-1)} \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \bar{\sigma}_i^2 + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \overline{\text{Kov}(r_i, r_j)} \\ &= \frac{1}{200} (0.29) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{200}\right) \times 0.065 = .0015 + .0647 \\ &= \underline{0.0662} ; \quad \sigma = (0.0662)^{1/2} = \underline{0.2573} \end{aligned}$$

(b) 10 tilfeldig valgte aksjer

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(r_p) &= 0.10(0.29) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{10}\right) 0.065 \\ &= 0.0290 + 0.0644 = \underline{0.0934} \end{aligned}$$

Jai, du si
vær!

$$\Rightarrow \sigma_p = \underline{0.3055} \quad \ll \bar{0.54} = (0.29)^{1/2}$$

Oppgave 5 (Ref. oppgave 3 i oppg. sett #3)

$$U(x, y) = 2\sqrt{x} + y$$

$$m = 10; p_x = 0,50$$

$$p_y = 1$$

$$MU_x = \frac{1}{\sqrt{x}}$$

$$MU_y = 1 \Rightarrow \frac{MU_x}{MU_y} = \frac{p_x}{p_y} = \frac{p_x}{1}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{x}} = p_x; x = \frac{1}{p_x^2}$$

Initially; for $p_x = 0,50$; $x = \frac{1}{(0,50)^2} = 4$

into budget: $0,50(4) + y = 10; y = 8$

$$U(x, y) = U(4, 8) = 2\sqrt{4} + 8 = 12$$

- (a) Compensating variation (cv) due to price-reduction
of $x = \text{chocolate consumption/demand}$

$$x = \frac{1}{(0,20)^2} = 25; U(25, y) = 2\sqrt{25} + y = 12$$

$$y = 2 \text{ ("basket B")}$$

Budget: $0,20(25) + 2 = 7 < 10 \Rightarrow CV = -3$

"New basket" C: $0,20(25) + y = 10; y = 5$

$$U(25, 5)_{\text{basket C}} = 2\sqrt{25} + 5 = 15$$

- (b) Equivalent variation (zero income effect) = EV

$$U(x, y) = 15$$

$$p_x = 0,50; x = 4$$

$$U(x, y) = 15 = 2\sqrt{4} + y = 15; y = 11$$


Budget: $0,50(4) + 11 = 13 > 10; EV = 13 - 10 = 3$

Oppgave 5, con't

Krasilniers myte $\Rightarrow CV = EV$

\Rightarrow "comp. margin" = "elværdesmarginen"

EV (elværdesmarginen) blir tegnet ned!



Varian, page 252 + fig. 14.2

"Approximating a continuous demand"

Varian, pp. 254 - 258:

Compensating and Equivalent Variation

Seminar #6

Oppgave 6Seminar #6

$$U(x, y) = x \cdot y$$

$x \equiv$ demand for food; $p_x = 9$ (initially)

$y \equiv$ " clothing; $p_y = 1$

$M \equiv$ monetary (cash) income = 72

Initial optimal consumption (demand) requires that:

$$\textcircled{1} \text{ on budget-line: } 9x + y = 72$$

$$\textcircled{2} \frac{Ml_{lx}}{Ml_{ly}} = \frac{p_x}{p_y} \Rightarrow \frac{y}{x} = \frac{9}{1} \Rightarrow y = 9x$$

Two equations in two unknowns;

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 9x + y = 72 \\ y = 9x \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow 9x + 9x = 72; \quad \underline{x = 4}; \quad \underline{y = 36}$$

$$U(x, y) = x \cdot y = 4 \cdot 36 = \underline{\underline{144}}$$

Let p_x fall to 1 (from initially 9) per unit ... new consumption?

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 4x + y = 72 \\ y = 4x \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow 4x + 4x = 72; \quad \underline{x = 9}; \quad \underline{y = 4(9) = 36}$$

$$U(x, y) = 9 \cdot 36 = \underline{\underline{324}} \quad (\text{Final consumption-choice})$$

(a) Compensating variation (CV) eq Equivalent variation (EV)

CV: Holding utility unchanged from initial basket;

$$U(x, y) = x \cdot y = 4 \cdot 36 = \underline{\underline{144}}$$

$$\frac{Ml_{lx}}{Ml_{ly}} = \frac{p_x}{p_y} \Rightarrow \frac{y}{x} = 4; \quad y = 4x \quad \underbrace{\text{"decomposition basket"}}$$

$$U(x, y) = 144 = x \cdot y = x(4x) = 4x^2; \quad \underline{x = 6}; \quad \underline{y = 24}$$

$$\text{Budget: } p_x \cdot x + p_y \cdot y = 1(6) + 1(24) = \underline{\underline{30}}$$

CV = ($M - \text{'new budget'}$) = $72 - 30 = \underline{\underline{24}}$... amount of cash that can be given up after price-reduction in order to be as well off as before price-reduction

Ref. oppgave 2
i Seminar #3

Oppgave 6, fattetlelse (Ref oppgave 2 - Seminar #3)

(a) CV = 24; but what's the EV?

EV: Holding utility unchanged from final consumption-basket
 $U(x,y) = x \cdot y = 9 \cdot 36 = \underline{324}$

Evaluating the 'decomposition-basket' ($x=6$; $y=24$) at initial price ($p_x = 9$):

$$U(x,y) = 324 = x \cdot y = x(9x); \quad \underline{x=6}; \quad \underline{y=54}$$

$$\text{Budget: } 9(6) + 1(54) = 108 > m = 72$$

$$\underline{\text{EV}} = 108 - 72 = \underline{36} \dots \text{amount of cash received}$$

before price-reduction in order to keep utility the same
 $(U(x,y) = 324)$ as after price-reduction

(b) $CV \neq EV$ since income-effect $\neq 0$

(see problem 2 - Seminar #3)

Varian; pp. 251-2 and pp. 102-103 Varian

Quasi-linear preferences (utility): Zero 'income-effect' since changes in income don't affect demand. Thus; $CV = EV$.

In general, for non-quasi-linear preferences; there is an income-effect present. Thus; demand for a good changes when income changes, and $CV \neq EV$ (i.e. change in consumer surplus represents only an approximation to the change in consumers' utility).

See fig. 6.8: Quasilinear preferences

page 103 Varian - vertical Engle-curve;

"... as income changes, the demand for good 1 remains constant."

Zero income effect